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was inapplicable, and that Mac Mahon v. Bergeson constitutes "new"
law. Would this mean that recovery, within the field of ordinary negli-
gence, is dependent upon whether plaintiff's pre-existing impairment is
physical or mental? Does this case support the proposition that liability
may attach to defendant's ordinary negligence toward "physically"
subnormal plaintiff A, but "mentally" subnormal plaintiff B is damnum
absque injuria? "The utter relativity of the suggested norms would
seem to augur considerable uncertainty for future cases of this kind in
Wisconsin."3
FREDERIC N. SPIDELL
Practice: Option to Plaintiff to Take Reasonable Verdict as Al-
ternative to New Trial for Excessive Damages-Plaintiff, appellant,
was a passenger in one of two automobiles involved in an accident. The
jury found the drivers of both automobiles causally negligent and fixed
damages at $1,500 for pain and suffering and $5,000 for permanent in-
juries. The trial court found that there was not proper medical testi-
mony to support a finding of permanent injury and changed the jury's
answer to the question relating to permanent injury from "yes" to "no."
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for $1,500. The Supreme
Court, in Powers v. Allstate Insurance Co.,1 held that it was error on
the part of the trial court to change the jury's verdict and that there was
sufficient medical testimony to support a finding of permanent injury
but that the damages assessed were excessive. The Supreme Court then
stated:
Heretofore, in such a situation it has been customary to fix the
lowest amount an unprejudiced jury, properly instructed, might
award for damages, and then grant to the plaintiff the option of
taking such amount or having a new trial.2
The Supreme Court now adopts the rule that, "where an excessive
verdict is not due to perversity or prejudice, and is not the result of
error occurring during the course of the trial, the plaintiff should be
granted the option of remitting the excess over and above such sum as
the court shall determine is the reasonable amount of plaintiff's dam-
ages, or of having a new trial on the issue of damages."' 3 The court thus
overruled Heimlich v. Tabor4 and Campbell v. Sutliff- in so far as they
held that such a rule violated defendant's constitutional right to a trial
by jury. The court granted to the plaintiff the option of taking either
$3,000 for permanent injury or a new trial on the issue of damages.
32 GHIARDI, AIKEN & CORMAN, PERSONAL INJURY COMMIENTATOR, 1958 Annual,
ed. note p. 88.
1 10 Wis. 2d 78 (1960).
2 Id. at 87.3Id. at 91.
4 123 Wis. 525, 102 N.W. 10 (1905).
5 193 Wis. 307, 214 N.W. 374, 53 A.L.R. 771 (1927).
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The question which will be primarily dealt with here is whether the
rule of the Powers case invades the right to trial by jury which is pro-
tected by the Wisconsin Constitution.6 There can be no question but
that such a rule does not violate the "due process" clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.7 This discussion
will therefore be restricted to the effect of the ruling upon the Wis-
consin Constitution.
An inquiry into the constitutionality of a remittitur is pertinent
only when the court declares the verdict to be excessive or inadequate
and then allows an option which if exercised will avoid a new trial
without the consent of one of the parties, and if the consent lacking is
that of the plaintiff's, allows a recovery for less than the greatest sum
a reasonable jury could find or, if the defendant's consent is lacking, al-
lows a recovery for more than the least sum a reasonable jury could
find. The rule of the Powers case is in the latter category. Thus, if
both parties are given an election between a court fixed sum and a new
trial and the consent of both is required to avoid a new trial, no injury
is done to either party. Likewise, if the verdict be found excessive and
the plaintiff be allowed his option of a new trial or the lowest amount
a reasonable jury could have found," the defendant has no right to com-
plain because any verdict below the lowest amount a reasonable jury
could return, would be set aside by the court as inadequate.
But what is this right to trial by jury which is protected by the
Wisconsin Constitution and how is it effected by the rule in the Powers
case? The constitutional right to trial by jury requires that questions
of fact be decided by the jury.9 The question of damages, when they
are unliquidated, is an issue of fact and an issue which the jury must
determine. 10 Therefore, if there were nothing further to consider, it
could be said that if the court sets the amount of damages and one of
the parties is not given an opportunity to object, that party's right to
trial by jury has been violated.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, pointed out in support of
its ruling that : 1) this right to trial by jury is that right as it existed
6 Wis. CONsT. Art. 1, §4: "The right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy,
but a trial by jury may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner
perscribed by law."
A right to trial by jury is not an essential part of due process and since the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees no particular form of procedure a statute
may retain or abolish juries. Walker v. Sauvient, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); Heim-
lich v. Tabor, 123 Wis. 565, 102 N.W. 10 (1905).
s Supra notes 4 and 5.
1 "When an issue of fact be made in a cause, it must be tried by the jury."
Haskin v. Wilson, 5 Wis. 106 (1856); U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 24 F. Supp.
575 (W.D. Wis. 1938).10 Assessment of damages in an action for personal injuries is peculiarly for thejury. Nelson v. Deluth St. Railway Co., 127 Wis. 28, 121 N.XV. 388 (1928);
Schmidt v. Reiss, 186 Wis. 574, 579, 203 N.W. 362 (1925).
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at the time of the adoption of the Constitution ;11 2) decisions in other
jurisdictions advocate the same rule;12 and 3) "If the court has the
power to hold a verdict for a certain amount excessive, it necessarily
follows that it has the power to determine an amount which is not
excessive. '13 From these premises the court comes to the conclusion
that, ".... when a court determines that a certain amount is a reason-
able amount to allow for the plaintiff's unliquidated damages, it is
equivalent to holding that such an amount is not excessive."'1 4 Each
of these reasons will now be considered separately to determine
whether any one of them taken alone or all of them taken collectively
is sufficient to lift the bar of seeming unconstitutionality which the
Wisconsin Constitution places before any restriction of an individual's
right to trial by jury.
I. "The right to trial by jury preserved by this provision of the con-
stitution is the right as it existed at the time of the adoption of the
constitution in 1848."'1- The term "trial by jury" standing alone would
be ambiguous. It is to be defined as it was defined in 1848. Thus if this
practice had been recognized at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution, it could not now be unconstitutional because it would have been
incorporated into the definition of "trial by jury" which the Constitution
adopted. The court relies upon Corcoran v. Harrian' and Baker v.
The City of Madison1 in support of its position that the early Wiscon-
sin rule is the same as the rule laid down by the Powers case. However,
the court bypasses the earlier cases which hold that such a rule is not
valid. In Nudd v. Wells 8 the court stated that the verdict was clearly
excessive.
But if the excess was clearly ascertainable, and the proper amount
of damages might be readily fixed by the application of a settled
rule of law to the evidence, perhaps the practice adopted by the
court below of allowing the plaintiff to remit the excess, and the
refusing of a new trial, would be proper.' 9
After giving examples of instances where remittitur would be allowed
because damages were fixed, the court states:
But it ought not to be construed so far as to allow the court,
when a jury has obviously mistaken the law, or the evidence, and
rendered a verdict which ought not stand, to substitute its judg-
ment for theirs, and after determining upon the evidence what
11 Campbell v. Sutliff, supra note 5.
12 Supra note 1, at 91.
13 Id. at 90.
14 Ibid.
15 Supra note 5.
1855 Wis. 120, 127, 12 N.W. 486 (1882).
1762 Wis. 137, 22 N.W. 121 (1884).
18 11 Wis. 426 (1859).
39 1d. at 434.
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amount ought to be allowed, allow the plaintiff to remit the excess
and then refuse a new trial.20 (Emphasis ours.)
Therefore, it seems clear that in the cases which immediately follow the
adoption of our Constitution that the practice of remittitur not only was
not adopted but was specifically disapproved.
II. The court found that other jurisdictions allow the use of remittitur
under a process similar to that advocated in the Powers case. How-
ever, both of the law review articles cited2' by the court suggest that
the Wisconsin Rule under the Campbell v. Sutliff= decision is the better
reasoned rule. The practice of remittitur which has long been established
in the federal courts in Northern Pacific R.R. v. Herbert23 was put in a
somewhat doubtful light by the Supreme Court in the case of Difrick
v. Schiedt24 when that court said: "It therefore may be that if the
question of remittitur were before us for the first time, it would be
decided otherwise. ' 25 In effect the court appears to be saying that
one of the principal reasons that the practice of remittitur has been
sustained is the long line of decided cases which have sanctioned the
practice. It would seem that this long line of precedent can be traced
back to Mr. justice Story's opinion in the case of Blunt v. Little.2 6
The decision in that case has been criticized because no attempt was
made, when deciding it, to ascertain the common law rule on the
subject.2 7 It also appears that Mr. justice Story himself may have
20 Ibid.; see also: Bushee v. Wright, 1 Pin. 104 (1840). A remittitur was allowed
but the action was upon a note and the damages were liquidated; Bichard v.
Booth, 4 Wis. 67 (1855), action for assault and battery. The court refused to
even set aside the verdict unless the verdict were so excessive as to show
marks of passion, prejudice, or corruption; Potter, Adm'r, v. Chicago & North-
western Railway Co., 22 Wis. 615 (1868), in action for the death of a ten
yr. old girl, the court said at 620: "this court has adopted it (remittitur)
, where a portion of the judgment was illegal, but which however was
readily assertainable by the record. But it has decided that when such is not
the case, it would not substitute its judgment for that of the jury and allow
the part to remit accordingly, and then affirm the judgment." (emphasis ours).
In Goodnow v. The City of Oshkosh, 28 Wis. 300 (1871), an action for per-
sonal injuries, the court refused to allow a remittitur but granted a new trial
and indicated the amount beyond which the verdict would be excessive. They
specifically refused to adopt "the New York Rule"; In Zitske v. Goldberg, 38
Wis. 216 (1875), an action for replevin and damages to a horse, the court in-
dicated that it would grant a remittitur where damages were allowed in excess
of the jurisdiction of the court, the amount of such remittitur being clearly
ascertainable.
21Renittitur and Additur, 44 Yale Law Journal 318, 325 (1934); Remittiturrs
and Additurs, 49 W. Va. Law Quarterly 1 (1946).22 Supra note 5.
23 116 U.S. 642, 646 (1885).
24 293 U.S. 474 (1934).
2 5 Id. at 484.
26 3 Mason 102 (1822).
27 "It is however, remarkable that in none of these cases was there any real
attempt to assertain the Common Law rule upon the subject. Mr. Justice
Story, in the Blunt Case, cited two English cases antedating the Constitution
in support simply of his conclusion that the court had the power to grant a
new trial for excessive damages and then announced without more that unless
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reconsidered his opinion in that case. 28 However, it is certain that the
practice of remittitur is firmly established in the Federal Courts, but
that the Supreme Court of the United States did not favor the practice
enough to extend its scope to include additur.29 The Court distinguished
additur from remittitur on the grounds that when the jury returns a
verdict which is excessive and the court requires a remittitur,
... what remains is included in the verdict along with the un-
lawful excess-in that sense ... it has been found by the jury-
and the remittitur has the effect of merely lopping off an ex-
crescence. But where the verdict is too small, an increase by the
court is a bald addition of something which in no sense can be
said to be included by the jury. 0
This distinction has been criticized 31 and the important distinction seems
to be that remittitur has long been allowed while additur has not.
32
Furthermore the English courts have abandoned the practice.33
III. The power to set aside a verdict gives the power to determine the
exact amount of the verdict. This is based upon the proposition that the
court could, from the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion, set aside a verdict.34 The court can, of course, set aside a verdict
as excessive but only when so excessive as to "shock the judicial con-
science.13 5 Thus the court cannot say simply that it does not agree with
the jury and on that ground set aside the verdict. 36 The power to set
the plaintiff should be willing to remit $500 of his damages the case would be
submitted to another jury. For the latter conclusion no authority whatever
was cited." Supra note 24, at 484.28 Savanah, Florida, & Western Ry. v. Harper, 70 Ga. 119, 126 (1883), the Georgia
Court said: "In another case 2 Ib., 670, 671, he laid down the rule: In no case
will the court ask itself whether, if it had been substituted instead of thejury, it would have given precisely the same damages, but the court will sim-
ply consider whether the verdict is fair and reasonable, and in the exercise of
its sound discretion, under all of the circumstances of the case, it will be
deemed so, unless the verdict is so excessive or outrageous with reference to
those circumstances as to demonstrate that the jury have acted against the
rules of law or have suffered their passion or prejudice or perverse disregard
of justice, to mislead them."29 Supra note 24.
30 Ibid.3 1 Supra note 21.
32 Supra note 24.
3 Watt v. Watt, L.R. (1905) A.C. 115; The court expressly repudiated the doc-
trine which was sanctioned in Belt v. Lawes, L.R. 12 Q.B. Div. 365 (1905).
3- Supra note 1, at 89.
35 "Since it is for the jury and not for the court to set the amount of damages,
their verdict in an action for unliquidated damages will not be set aside merely
because it is large or because the reviewing court would have awarded less.
Full compensation is impossible in the abstract and different individuals will
vary in their estimate of the sum which will be a just pecuniary compensation.
Hence all that the court can do is see that the jury approximates a sane esti-
mate, or as it is sometimes said, see that the results attained do not shock the
judicial conscience. 15 Am. Jur., Damages §625 at 622. T hi s r u I e i s
adopted in Wisconsin by the cases of Bethke v. Duwe, 256 Wis. 378, 384, 41




aside as excessive only gives the power to determine the limits within
which a verdict is neither excessive or inadequate, limits which in the
case of personal injury might include a wide range of possible verdicts.
The power to control does not give the power to find a verdict. "Like
the executive veto, it arrests, but does not by its exercise give the power
to enact."37 Thus the court in the Powers case is, in effect, saying that
it cannot and will not set aside a verdict as excessive unless it is clearly
excessive, that is, it will not set aside a verdict because it is one dollar
too much, but that this power to set aside a verdict when clearly exces-
sive gives the court the power to determine the exact amount of the
verdict. It is a very different thing to say that a verdict is clearly exces-
sive than it is to say that the verdict shall be this particular amount.
It is very similar to the difference between saying that you will not pay
more than $100 for a particular article and saying that you will pay
$50 for it.
The court adopted the practice that it did in the Powers case for a
pragmatic reason, namely, that such a remittitur would expedite litiga-
tion and lessen the expense thereof. That this end would be accom-
plished can hardly be doubted. Nor can it be doubted that such an end
is a desirable one. It would seem unfortunate, however, that the court
would abandon a practice which has been in effect in this state for over
a half a century, on these grounds. It is to be desired that when the
question of additur is presented to the court it will follow the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Dimick v. Schiedt3s and refuse
to extend the rule any further. This would have the merit of bringing
Wisconsin into line with the Federal law on the question. However,
it would seem even more desirable if the court would reconsider its
position on the question of remittitur.
JOSEPH P. JORDAN
Federal Income Taxation-Deductions: Corporate Expenditures
Not Incurred in Carrying On a Trade or Business-Petitioner, a
closely-owned corporation, was engaged in the brewery supply busi-
ness, and also owned rental property. It purchased certain lake-
shore residential property and added extensive improvements so
that the property was usable as a summer residence and for enter-
tainment. The officers and stockholders of the corporation, all closely
related, lived on the premises for about three months each summer,
paying $9,000 rent annually. The expenses deducted by petitioner
for the depreciation and maintenance of this property amounted to
approximately $35,000 a year. The Commissioner allowed the cor-
porate taxpayer a deduction of only $9,000 each year, that is, to the
37 Supra note 28.38Supra note 24.
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